

Replicating Electoral Success

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Full Paper

01 Background

Hotelling–Downs: Two office-seeking candidates will adopt the policy of the median voter


Duverger’s Law: empirical finding that plurality leads to two-party systems.

Plurality Elections: each voter casts one vote, the candidate with the most votes wins

1-Euclidean Preferences: voters and candidates occupy points in the unit interval $[0, 1]$; voters prefer closer candidates.

How do the policies of boundedly rational candidates evolve over time?

02 Overview




Our Model \equiv evolutionary replicator dynamics

- ✓ Population of k -candidate plurality elections proceeding in rounds
- ✓ Candidates copy an electorally successful policy from the previous round
- ✓ For theory: uniformly distributed voters

With few-candidate elections, policies converge to the center; with many candidates, they do not.


03 Results




Theorem: With $k \leq 4$ candidates per election, the candidate distribution converges to $1/2$.

Theorem: With $k \geq 5$ candidates per election, the candidate distribution **does not** converge to $1/2$.

✓ Our results hold even with noise:



Theorem: With $k \leq 4$ candidates per election, **some of which are positioned at random**, the candidate distribution approximately converges to $1/2$, but not when $k \geq 5$




$$F_{2,t}(x) = \frac{[2F_0(x)]^{2t}}{2}$$

$$F_{3,t}(x) \leq F_0(x) \cdot \left[\frac{3}{4} + F_0(x)^2 \right]^t$$


$$F_{4,t}(x) \leq F_0(x) \cdot \left[1 - 4 \left(\frac{1}{2} - F_0 \left(\frac{x}{3} + \frac{1}{3} \right) \right)^3 \right]^t$$

(F_0 symmetric, $x < 0.5$)

04 Further Simulations



✓ Our results hold under variations of the model:



Research supported in part by:

